Waiting for fog in Darwin! - Tony Cunnane's Life and Times

Continued from here

A search party found me at about 1000hrs. I was mildly hung over after my boozy flight from Singapore and I had a desperate thirst. They took me to the RAAF Darwin Officers Mess bar and used my needs as the excuse for opening the bar and starting an impromptu drinking session which went on for several hours during which I consumed a large number of ice-cold 'tinnies'. A senior officer eventually arrived, relieved me of my locked briefcase and said I could take the rest of the day off. My Boss in Air HQ at Changi, who had himself served time in Australia, had warned me before I'd set off not to let the RAAF officers drink me under the table. He said Poms were fair game and I would find that the ice-cold beer would slip down the throat easily but was surprisingly strong. As it happens, I was the last person to leave the bar (presumably the residents had to go back to work!). I felt fitter than at any time since leaving Singapore 24 hours earlier.

The next day I gave my Top Secret operational presentation to all the senior RAAF officers. They treated me with great respect apparently because they had all heard that I was a 'rare POM who could hold his liquor!' Four Victor bombers were to fly by night at low level, mainly at a height of 500 feet above the sea, from Tengah in Singapore to Darwin. 'Confrontation' was one of those euphemisms so loved by politicians to avoid using the word 'war'. Malaysia and Indonesia were in a state of confrontation but not a state of war. Nevertheless, RAF flights did not routinely fly over Indonesian territory. The Victors would use what was then known as the Blue Route - a devious route entirely over sea through the Indonesian archipelago, taking care to avoid Indonesian airspace - deemed in those days to be three nautical miles from any land. A glance at a map of that part of the world will show what a convoluted route was needed and the Victor navigators needed to keep their wits about them. Indeed, I doubt if the aircraft were able to avoid over-flying every one of the many hundreds of small islands.

To comply with international air traffic control regulations, formal flight plans would be submitted - but only once the bombers were airborne from Tengah. It was assumed that the very poor communications that existed in the 1960s would ensure that the Indonesian military authorities would get no advance knowledge of the flights. On the approach to the north coast of Australia the Victor bombers were briefed to descend as low as regulations permitted and then carry out a simulated bombing run on the Darwin air base, hoping to evade the new air defence radar that was about to be commissioned in the presence of the Australian Defence Minister. But it turned out that there was an unforeseen problem with the plan! The flights were timed so that the Victors would land at Darwin at first light.

In 1965 there was no other airfield within range anywhere in northern Australia that was long enough for the under-powered Mark 1 Victors to land and take off. The bombers would be short of fuel when they approached the north coast of Australia so the weather forecast for Darwin was crucial. It had been arranged that the Victors would not take off from Tengah until I had sent a teleprinter signal to Air HQ to say that the weather at dawn would be perfect. I was to send the signal, using the highest precedence and classified Top Secret, no later than one hour before the planned Victor take-off time. If there were any doubts I was to recommend a 24 hour delay. Accordingly at the first opportunity I took myself to the Met Office at RAAF Darwin and consulted the staff. That was when the trouble started.

"At this time of year we almost always have clear blue skies with unlimited visibility," I was told. "However, it's winter here, as you know, and the dew point can be quite low at the end of the night so there's a 20 per cent probability of radiation fog around dawn valid until 0800 local time."

"But how likely is it that fog will form?" I persisted. I explained why I needed more clarification.

"As I said," replied the Met Officer patiently, "there's a 20 per cent probability that it will, which means there's an 80 per cent probability that it won't. It's your decision."

Clearly the Met Officer was not going to put himself in the position of scapegoat. I signalled this pearl of wisdom through to Singapore and recommended a 24 hour delay. I, a mere junior flight lieutenant, did not wish to be blamed if fog came down and four valuable bombers ran out of fuel because there was nowhere to land! To while away an hour or two, I was taken for an enjoyable ride around the local area of Darwin in a helicopter.

The same thing happened the next day, and the third day (the weather forecasts, not trips in a helicopter). By this time the RAAF senior officers were worried because the Defence Minister was still hanging around waiting to see how effective their new air defence radar would be. I explained to the Base Commander that the Victors would be short of fuel when they arrived and with no suitable diversion airfield they could not risk arriving if it was foggy. Not on a peacetime mission anyway!

"In that case we’ll be waiting three months," said the Base Commander dryly. "The Met folk put 20 per cent prob of fog in their forecast every day at this time of year just to cover themselves. We’ve not actually had any fog here at Darwin in living memory."

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