








 |
Close Encounter
“Tanker, emergency break, emergency break, up and left now!!” The Victor Mk 1/1A in its various tanker configurations was a
pleasant and unforgiving aircraft to fly but it was desperately short of power.
In my first few months on 214 Squadron I had the opportunity to find that out
for myself when I inadvertently explored the maximum and minimum speeds
possible.
My crew’s very first all-solo operational tanking sortie was
on 16 April 1971. Only two days earlier we had successfully passed our final
handling sortie with the Squadron QFI, Paul Gausden. The solo flight was a
standard refuelling sortie on Towline 6, off the Suffolk coast. We expected a
series of Lightnings coming up in pairs from 29 and 111 Squadrons at Wattisham.
Normally such sorties were conducted under radar control from Eastern Radar but
on this occasion we were operating with No 1 Air Control Centre, call sign Romeo,
a mobile tactical facility operating from a field somewhere in deepest East
Anglia.
The weather was perfect with unlimited visibility; from our
vantage point at 35,000 ft we could see all of East Anglia and beyond. The first
part of the sortie was uneventful and we quickly off-loaded 18,000 lbs of fuel
to the ever-thirsty F3 Lightnings. As we were turning left at the southern-most
end of the towline, with two Lightnings in contact taking on fuel, I suddenly
heard an urgent radio call from one of two other Lightnings that were holding a
couple of hundred yards astern awaiting their turn to refuel.
“Tanker, emergency break, emergency break, up and left now!!”
Knowing that my refuelling operator, Ken Hulse, would have
immediately switched the red lights at the rear of the refuelling pods on,
thereby instructing the Lightnings in contact to make an emergency disconnect, I
slammed all four throttles fully open, and pulled the aircraft into a steep
climbing left hand turn. As I took hold of the control column, the auto-pilot
instinctive cut-out switch under my thumb automatically disconnected the
auto-pilot.
A heavy Victor Mk 1 at 35,000 feet did not respond well to
such a manoeuvre! It would roll quite quickly but the extra thrust from the
engines, which had been running at about 90% anyway, was barely noticeable. A
second urgent radio call came.
“Tanker, pull harder, keeping turning.”
By this time the Victor was performing something akin to a
wing-over; the airspeed was dropping rapidly – the last figure I saw was 130 kts
and still reducing. I could not pull back any further because the aircraft would
have stalled. The two refuelling hoses were probably flailing about quite
dangerously but we could not even contemplate jettisoning them without knowing
who was behind us. I pushed the control column forward to unload the wings and
increased the bank to 90 degrees. Suddenly there was a roar in the cockpit as
four jet pipes passed close overhead and then filled my forward windscreen,
before disappearing off to my right.
“Was that a VC-10!” I called on the radio to no-one in
particular. All I had seen were four tail-mounted jet pipes.
“No, it was an Aeroflot IL-62,” replied the Lightning pilot
who had given me the warning.
By this time I had got the Victor into a dive and the speed
was increasing rapidly to a much more sensible figure. I levelled the wings and
gently pulled out to straight and level flight. I had to be gentle: the maximum
permitted loading at our all up weight was 2.3g which did not give much scope
for aerobatics.
Throughout those frantic few seconds no word was heard from
Romeo and they did not answer radio calls. My AEO, Neil Flowerdew, changed
frequency and filed an immediate air miss report over the radio with Eastern
Radar. Apart from that my crew were uncharacteristically silent as we returned
to Marham. After landing I called the Lightning pilots at Wattisham to thank
them and get their version of the story.
It seems that the controllers at Romeo had seen and heard
nothing because they had decided to have a shift change while we were turning
northbound at the southern end of the Towline, but they had not bothered to tell
us. So much for radar control! The Lightnings taking on fuel from me saw nothing
of the incipient disaster because they were, quite properly, concentrating all
their attention on keeping station on the refuelling hoses.
One of the Lightning pilots waiting his turn to refuel had
saved the situation by keeping a good all-round look out to protect his Leader
and his tanker. He had seen the IL-62 in a climb coming towards the formation
and he realised that there was imminent danger of collision and had ordered the
emergency break. Two other Lightnings about 20 miles away climbing out of
Wattisham under the control of Eastern Radar on a different frequency had seen
the whole incident but were unable to do anything other than warn the Eastern
Radar controller whose only contact with Romeo was by telephone. One of those
pilots told me that the IL-62 had appeared to fly right through the middle of
the formation from behind and he could not believe that there had not been a
mid-air collision. He said my wing-over had looked most impressive and he had
watched in amazement as the four Lightnings closest to me had scattered in all
directions..
It took nearly three months for the Air Miss final report to
reach me. The Aeroflot captain, having just departed Heathrow on a scheduled
service to Moscow with a full load of passengers, was many miles off-his flight
planned route. This had, apparently, gone unnoticed by the civil air traffic
controller but he was struggling a bit because his assistant at Heathrow had
passed incorrect flight plan details for the Aeroflot anyway. The Aeroflot
captain gave evidence that he saw neither any Lightnings nor the Victor so he
had not submitted an air miss report at the time. Remarkable really because the
entire action took place directly in front of him and had he bothered look out
of the front of his cockpit it would have been impossible not to see us! Perhaps
he was having a late breakfast – or perhaps he was deliberately off course so
that he, or someone else on board, could monitor the refuelling operation. Back to top |